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Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. v. Cash, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 88 (December 31, 2020)1 
TORT LAW: The right of contribution exists when two parties are jointly or severally liable for 
the same injury.  
Summary 
The Court held that a tortfeasor who settles with a plaintiff may bring a contribution 
claim against a doctor who allegedly caused new injuries when treating the original injury. If two 
parties are jointly and severally liable for the same injury, a right to contribution exists. It is 
immaterial whether the parties are joint or successive tortfeasors; however, both parties must be 
liable for the injury for which the contribution is sought.  
Background 
Marie Gonzales was injured in an accident involving one of Republic’s employees. Dr. 
Andrew Cash treated Ms. Gonzales’s original injury and allegedly inflicted further injuries. Ms. 
Gonzales sued Republic, and the parties settled for $2 million. The settlement agreement 
terminated Ms. Gonzales’s claims against her medical providers. Ms. Gonzales did not pursue a 
claim against Dr. Cash.  
Within one year of the settlement agreement, Republic sued Dr. Cash for contribution. 
Republic alleged that Dr. Cash committed malpractice and caused Ms. Gonzales further injuries 
than those she originally sustained from the accident. Republic contended that it could seek 
contribution from Dr. Cash because the settlement agreement discharged Ms. Gonzales’s claims 
against him and levied liabilities on Republic that outweighed its share. Dr. Cash claimed he was 
a successive tortfeasor, not a joint tortfeasor, and therefore Republic could not recover 
contribution. 
The district court held that contribution was unavailable between successive tortfeasors 
and granted summary judgment to Dr. Cash. Additionally, the district court held that the 
settlement agreement terminated the defendant’s liability. Republic appealed this decision.  
Discussion  
 The Court first looked to Nevada’s contribution statute to determine when one tortfeasor 
can recover from another tortfeasor.  
 Under Nevada law, contribution allows a “‘tortfeasor who had paid more than his or her 
equitable share of the common liability’ to recover the excess from a second tortfeasor, up to the 
amount of the second tortfeasor’s ‘equitable share of the entire liability’”2 However, the 
tortfeasor alleging the contribution claim can only recover if the settlement terminates the second 
tortfeasor’s liability.3  
 
1  By Alexandra Russell. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.225(2) (2019). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.225(3) (2019). 
 Next, the Court looked to its precedent to reiterate that contribution claims by original 
tortfeasors are permitted against physicians who negligently treat the original injury.4 The Court 
also relied on other state court decisions which reached the same conclusion.5 However, the 
Court noted that no right to contribution exists if a successive tortfeasor causes a completely 
independent injury. 
 The Court then applied the right of contribution’s definition and precedent to conclude 
that Dr. Cash was subject to a contribution claim as a joint tortfeasor. Since Dr. Cash treated Ms. 
Gonzales for the accident involving Republic, he and Republic are liable for injuries caused by 
malpractice and are therefore joint tortfeasors.6 Thus, Republic was liable for Dr. Cash’s 
malpractice and Dr. Cash was liable to Republic in excess of Republic’s equitable share of the 
liability. Additionally, Ms. Gonzales’s termination of her claims against Dr. Cash do not hinder 
Republic’s contribution claim. The right of contribution can come from a settlement between a 
plaintiff and one tortfeasor as long at the settlement terminates the other tortfeasor’s liability for 
the original tort.7 This was the case here, as Ms. Gonzales’s settlement contained a provision that 
discharged any claims she could bring against a medical provider. Therefore, the district court 
incorrectly concluded that Dr. Cash was not subject to contribution because he was a successive 
tortfeasor.   
Conclusion 
The Court concluded that the right of contribution exists when two or more parties are 
jointly or severally liable for the same injury and one party pays more than its equitable share. 
Thus, it is immaterial whether the tortfeasors are joint or successive. The Court reversed the 
district’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Cash and remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings.  
 
4  Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 269, 277 P.3d 1246, 1249 (2012); Saylor v. Arcotta, 126 Nev. 92, 95, 225 P.3d 
1276, 1278 (2010).  
5  Lutz v. Boltz, 100 A.2d 647, 648 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953); Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehab. Corp., 909 P.2d 1025, 1030 
(N.M. 1995); Shadden v. Valley View Hosp., 915 P.2d 364, 368 (Okla. 1996). 
6  Pack, 128 Nev. at 269, 277 P.3d at 1249. 
7  Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev 644, 652, 98 P.3d 681, 687 (2004). 
